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Abstract
In repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by
different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or
less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of the-
oretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To
more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by al-
lowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution
to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individ-
ual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows
for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently.
Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes vol-
untary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no significant effect
on behavior.
Keywords: Public Good Game, Neighborhood, Cooperation, Experi-
mental Analysis
1 Introduction
Experimental research in economics has possibly been overshadowed too long
by the “revealed motive” approach, where motives have been preferences, aspi-
rations, or whatever one wanted to infer, namely to
• incentivize behavior, i.e., monetary earnings depend only on actions and
• derive the motive the researcher is interested in from observed behavior,
although this may be triggered by monetary incentives as well as more or
less uncontrolled other concerns.
This predominant methodology reverses the usual interpretation that mo-
tives and (action) beliefs determine behavior: instead of testing individual de-
cision rationality, the researcher assumes it. An obvious alternative to this
empirical method, which is still dominant in experimental economics, is to elicit
not only behavior but also motives (preferences, aspirations, etc.) and beliefs
(about the actions, motives, norms, etc., of others) and to incentivize these
statements (see [1] and [7]).
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Here we propose another way to weaken the “curse of the revealed motive
approach,” namely to increase the dimensionality of behavior. Instead of dis-
cussing this in abstract terms, we apply it to a repeated Public Good Game
played by the same group of players (partners design). In a Public Good Game
([8], [10]) the contribution of a player can express
• how selfish, respectively inefficiency averse, the player is,
• how the player wants to reward or punish earlier choices of others,
• what the player wants to signal to his co-players,
• what the player expects the others to do,
• etc.
The multiplicity of reasons illustrates how difficult it can be to infer the
actual reasons from behavior. By increasing the dimensionality of behavior,
i.e., not only eliciting the contributions but allowing for other dimensions of
behavior, these difficulties still exist but may be less serious.
There is, of course, a price to pay for such more informative data: One
changes the game, typically by making it more complex. We do not claim that
it is always worthwhile to pay this price but propose an awareness of the trade-
off between richer data, allowing to more clearly infer the motives, on the one
hand, and the complexity of the design on the other.
More specifically, we extend the (repeated) Public Good Game by allow-
ing players to locate their contributions to one of the player locations, i.e., by
imposing a network structure. This does not affect the overall efficiency of an
individual contribution but only who gains more or less from it. If benefits
depend on distance, the player where the contribution is located gains more
from it than a more distant player. However, locating the own contribution to
another position, makes a player suffer. As in ultimatum games (see [3] for a
review) the costs of punishing and rewarding others are endogenous: the smaller
the contribution the less costly it is to choose a non-self-serving location. The
intention to sanction or to reward by location thus provides an additional rea-
son for contributing less (for other studies of Public Good Games based in some
network structure see, e.g., [5], [2]).
Will participants nevertheless choose non-self-serving locations to reward or
punish their co-players? Corresponding results could allow us to interpret more
reliably why participants choose higher or lower contributions in repeated Public
Good Games implemented in a partners design.
Actually, only 16% of the participants never choose a non-self-serving loca-
tion, i.e., they reward and punish others. In addition, without the option of
choosing the location, there is less cooperation. Surprisingly, discrimination in
the sense of choosing a non-self-serving location has little or no impact on the
contribution level.
In Section 2 we introduce the voluntary contribution game with location
choices and its simple neighborhood structure. Section 3 presents our hypothe-
ses, while Section 4 provides an overview of our experimental design. The data,
comprising the individual contributions and location choices, are analyzed in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses our results. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Neighborhood Public Good Game
The Neighborhood Public Good Game is repeated T times. Four players (I =
{1, 2, 3, 4}) interact, and each Player i ∈ I is assigned to a different corner of
a square. The two players, occupying adjacent corners of the square, are the
direct neighbors of a Player i, the other player is i’s distant neighbor.
In each period t ∈ {1, ..., T}, each Player i receives the same integer en-
dowment e > 0. Player i then chooses the size of the contribution ct(i) with
1 ≤ ct(i) ≤ e and his location lt(i) ∈ I. Notice, that each player can contribute
ct(i) to the position of his neighbors or his own position. Nevertheless, he al-
ways keeps the difference e− ct(i) for himself. The location of contribution lt(i)
can be any corner of the square, i.e., the position of one of the four players.
In the following, we will also refer to lt(i) as the player located in corner lt(i).
Contributions have to be positive (ct(i) ≥ 1 for all i) to render their location
always payoff relevant. Further, the whole contribution ct(i) can only be located
to one location lt(i). That is, the player cannot divide the contribution among
different locations.
The location or player position of contribution lt(i) determines its constant
marginal productivity α(k, lt(i)). For any Player k the marginal productivity of
an individual contribution ct(i) is
α(k, lt(i)) =
 α for lt(i) = kα if k and lt(i) are direct neighbors
α if k and lt(i) are distant neighbors
where 1 > α > α > α > 0 and α+ 2α+ α > 1. Thus, the payoffs are given by
ut(k) = e− ct(k) +
∑
i
α(k, lt(i))ct(i)
for all Players k ∈ I and all periods t = 1, . . . , T with 1 ≤ ct(i) ≤ e for all i and
t. Although the location of contribution lt(i) affects the individual gains from
ct(i), it does not influence the aggregated payoff of all players,
∑
i ut(k). The
aggregated marginal benefit of a contribution is always α+ 2α+ α.
Clearly, the solution (from payoff maximizing) strategy for all four Players
i is c∗t (i) = 1 and l
∗
t (i) = i in all periods t. However, for an efficient outcome
all participants must choose c+t (i) = e and can select any location choice lt(i)
in all periods t.
3 Experiment
In the Neighborhood Public Good Game, which participants repeatedly inter-
act with their neighbors, participants interact in a partners design. Previous
studies (e.g., [9]) have shown that participants engage in initial cooperation but
reveal a downward sloping development of contributions with a further decline
of cooperation in the terminal period. We expect similar results for cT (i) in
the Neighborhood Public Good Game, where our participants can additionally
make self-serving location choices lt(i) = i.
Hypothesis 1: Participants will cooperate significantly less in the terminal
period T by
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(a) low last contributions cT (i) and
(b) self-serving location choices lT (i) = i.
By varying the values α, α, and α without changing the sum α + 2α + α,
we can change the discrimination power. Larger differences can, for instance,
allow to seriously harm the distant contact. Since we expected an increase in
cooperation when participants have more discrimination power, we conducted
two versions of the Neighborhood Public Good Game, Treatments M and M ,
by using different values for α, α, α:
M : α = 0.3, α = 0.5, α = 0.7 and
M : α = 0.4, α = 0.5, α = 0.6
Hypothesis 2: Participants will contribute more in the M -Treatment than in
the M -Treatment.
In addition, we performed control Treatments C and C of the Neighborhood
Public Good Treatments M and M , where the location choices of participants
are exogenously imposed. We did not inform participants of the control sessions
how locations were determined - all the C- and C- instructions say is “Locations
are predetermined and independent of your behavior.”
Hypothesis 3: Participants will contribute more in the M - than in the C-
Treatments.
4 Method
We conducted our experiments with 380 participants in the laboratory of the
Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. All participants were recruited
using ORSEE ([6]). They earned points as payoffs (100 points = e 0.20) and
received a show up fee of e 2.50. The average payoff was e 14.02.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
([4]). At the beginning of a session, participants were randomly seated in the
laboratory. A session lasted 60 to 90 minutes, including 25 minutes for reading
and understanding the instructions. We handed out the instructions in written
form (see A for an English translation) which were also read aloud. After
questions concerning the instructions were answered privately, understanding of
the instructions was checked by a control questionnaire. Participants who were
not able to answer these questions were replaced (altogether 15 participants).
A participant who was replaced received e 2.50 in addition to the show up fee.
At the end of each period, the experiment environment informed the partic-
ipants of their payoff, the contributions ct(i), and the location choices lt(i) of
all participants in the current period. No additional information concerning the
behavior of other participants was given.
Participants played twice for twenty periods. The 32 participants of one
session were split up in 8 groups of 4. In each period, participants received an
endowment of 10 tokens. Each token was worth 10 points so that participants
earned an integer number of points in each period. After the first twenty periods,
participants were rematched with new partners (perfect strangers rematching).
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Session Average Contribution Average Payoff
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
M 5.24 5.17 152 151
M 4.33 4.85 143 148
C 3.77 4.06 137 140
C 3.56 4.24 135 142
Table 1: Comparison of contribution and payoff per round in both repetitions
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Figure 1: Development of contributions per treatment
After each session we paid participants privately. We conducted three ses-
sions of each of the four Treatments (M , M , C, C), although with only 7 groups
of 4 participants each in one session of Treatment M .
5 Results
During each session, we repeated the game once. A comparison of the average
contribution of each independent group shows an increase in contributions and
payoffs in the repetition (binomial test, 10% significance level). For Treatment
M alone there is no such experience effect.
Result 1: Rather than converging to the benchmark behavior, based on com-
mon and commonly known monetary opportunism, more experienced partici-
pants manage to cooperate more.
In the remainder, we will mainly focus on the analysis of the first round
for two reasons: (1) In the first round, all groups are independent, and we can
rely on more independent data points when testing. (2) Except for the higher
contributions, and therefore higher payoffs, the second round reveals similar
patterns for all treatments (consider Tables 1 and 2) so that it seems preferable
to mention differences only where they occur.
5.1 Temporal aspects
To test Hypothesis 1, let us analyze the development of the average contribu-
tions.
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M M C C
Round 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Overall average 5.24 5.17 4.33 4.85 3.77 4.06 3.56 4.24
3.49 3.44 3.79 3.03 2.09 1.46 2.04 4.63
6.90 6.26 3.18 4.45 1.53 1.60 1.48 7.51
4.20 6.60 8.71 4.14 6.39 1.36 8.54 9.46
2.39 3.10 1.86 6.23 5.21 3.79 2.54 3.96
2.54 2.23 3.58 5.81 1.14 9.50 4.36 8.23
2.11 2.68 7.75 5.34 2.96 2.19 4.83 5.33
6.09 4.15 7.75 3.83 2.29 4.65 2.51 1.78
4.68 1.44 2.18 8.11 1.14 1.21 5.38 2.89
7.53 9.89 4.53 3.20 5.45 3.93 1.76 2.45
6.48 3.53 4.51 3.78 1.89 2.88 2.90 2.05
5.76 4.60 1.94 8.04 3.75 6.18 5.05 2.43
Average per 7.95 5.34 5.55 2.75 4.50 8.95 3.36 1.68
group 9.94 3.54 2.05 3.95 2.24 1.78 5.83 2.74
6.40 4.48 4.11 3.00 7.31 2.46 6.65 8.25
4.60 8.39 6.43 1.20 2.11 4.21 6.55 9.69
6.99 8.89 1.93 8.70 2.39 2.93 1.48 1.69
2.96 7.41 4.08 8.46 9.46 7.30 2.45 1.18
4.03 7.80 6.56 3.71 2.84 2.14 1.40 4.49
4.94 3.61 2.96 2.99 3.65 9.79 2.06 3.14
5.45 3.99 6.11 4.65 2.94 3.53 1.75 2.06
4.64 3.00 5.05 7.19 2.24 3.88 5.10 1.11
4.44 5.15 1.73 1.26 7.33 4.20 1.65 3.85
6.03 9.53 3.61 9.78 5.30 4.44 1.85 3.13
- - 3.88 2.91 4.30 3.33 4.04 9.21
Table 2: Average contributions per round
Figure 1 visualizes how contributions develop in all four treatments over all
twenty periods. Although cooperation tends to be high during the first few pe-
riods, it decreases over time. Comparing the contributions in the first nineteen
periods and the contributions in period 20 across all treatments and groups re-
veals a significantly smaller contribution in the last period (binomial test, 1%
significance level). This result holds for all four treatments (M -Treatment: bino-
mial test, 5% significance level; other treatments: binomial test, 1% significance
level).
To analyze whether the location choice of participants tends to be more
self-serving in the last period of a treatment (Hypothesis 1 (b)), we rely on the
relative frequency of self-selection and calculate this frequency both for the first
nineteen periods as well as for the last period. A binomial test confirms on a
significance level of 1% that over all M -Treatments the fraction of self-serving
location choices increases in the last period. This also holds, when analyzing
M - (binomial test, 5% significance level) and M -Treatments (binomial test, 1%
significance level) separately.
Result 2: There is a significant decrease in contributions as well as a sig-
nificantly larger degree of self-serving location choices in the terminal period
T = 20, confirming Hypothesis 1.
5.2 Influence of location choices
To analyze the impact of possible discrimination by location choices on behav-
ior (Hypothesis 3), we first focus on the average contributions per group (see
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Cooperators Defectors Participants
Strong Weak Weak Strong per Treatment
M 4 21 16 4 92
M 2 13 24 6 96
C 2 10 33 7 96
C 3 9 34 7 96
Table 3: Number of defectors and cooperators per treatment
Table 2). A two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test confirms on a significance level of
1% that the average contribution in M -Treatments is different from the average
contribution in C-Treatments. More specifically, we can conclude that the av-
erage contribution of M -Treatments is higher. Moreover, when comparing only
the M - and the C-Treatment, we can confirm these results (two-sided Mann-
Whitney-U Test, significance level of 1%), whereas for M - and C-Treatments,
we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal payoffs in both treatments on an ac-
ceptable significance level.
Result 3: Average contributions in M - are higher than in C-Treatments.
Why is there a clear difference when comparing M - and C-Treatments but
no difference between M - and C-Treatments? To analyze the strategies of par-
ticipants, we categorize the latter in four separate classes:
• Strong Cooperators contribute 10 tokens in all twenty periods.
• Weak Cooperators contribute 10 tokens not in all but at least in half the
periods.
• Weak Defectors contribute 1 token not in all but at least in half the periods.
• Strong Defectors contribute 1 token in all twenty periods.
Table 3 lists the number of participants in the corresponding classes in all
groups of each treatment. A comparison of the M - and C-Treatments with
respect to the numbers of cooperators (both strong and weak) per group shows
no difference between treatments. The results change, when analyzing M - and
C-Treatments and M - and C-Treatments separately. While we find no difference
between M - and C-Treatments, a significant difference between M - and C-
Treatments exists (one-sided Mann-Whitney-U test, significance level 5%).
The results are similar, when analyzing the number of defectors (again, both
strong and weak) per group. Here, a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test shows
a significant difference between M - and C-Treatments (significance level 5%).
When analyzing the number of cooperators, this result does not hold for M -
and C-Treatments, while it holds for M - and C-Treatments (two-sided Mann-
Whitney-U test, significance level 5%).
Result 4: When categorizing the strategies of participants, we find no difference
between the M - and the C-Treatment, whereas a significant difference in the
number of defectors and cooperators exists when comparing the M - and the
C-Treatment.
Next, we analyze the contribution level of non-self-serving locations (see Ta-
ble 4). For contributions lower than 10 only nonsignificantly higher investments
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ct(i) = 1 1 < ct(i) ≤ 5 5 < ct(i) < 10 ct(i) = 10 Sum
M 420 195 95 179 889
M 547 237 132 86 1002
C 638 432 92 255 1417
C 675 420 111 222 1428
Table 4: Number of contributions in non-self-serving locations
of non-self-serving locations occur for the M - than for the M -Treatment. The
situation changes when we analyze the maximum contribution ct(i) = 10. Here,
the number of non-self-serving locations per group are significantly higher in the
M - than the M -Treatment (one-sided Mann-Whitney-U test, significance level
5%).
Result 5: For very high contributions ct(i), i.e., ct(i) = 10, the number of non-
self-serving locations is significantly higher in Treatment M than in Treatment
M .
To sum up, we observe higher contributions in the M -Treatment than in
the C-Treatment due to the different frequencies of cooperators and defectors.
Therefore, we confirm Hypothesis 3 for these treatments. For the M - and the C-
Treatment similar results do not hold. Here, neither the number of cooperators,
nor the number of defectors, nor the contributions differ significantly. Appar-
ently, the disciplining effect of “punishment by location” becomes weaker with
additional discrimination power. In our view, this is due to the high costs of
non-self-serving location choices in Treatment M and C, where non-self-serving
locations for high contributions are very rare.
5.3 Influence of discrimination power
To confirm that participants are more cooperative in M - Treatments than in
M -Treatments (Hypothesis 2), we compare the average contributions in both
treatments. Quite surprisingly, but possibly explained by our previous Result
5, the overall average contribution per group in M -Treatments is higher than in
M -Treatments. However, using a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of equal contributions in both treatments on any
acceptable significance level, which rejects Hypothesis 2.
The average contributions of C- and C-Treatments are quite similar. Using
a Mann-Whitney-U test, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal contributions
on any acceptable significance level.
Result 6: There exists no significant difference in contributions between M -and
M -Treatments and C- and C-Treatments, respectively.
Comparing the first period contribution per group in Treatments M and M
reveals no significant difference (Mann-Whitney-U test). Likewise, comparing
the location choice of the contribution in the first period by a Mann-Whitney-U
test does not allow to reject the hypothesis of equal frequencies of self-serving
location choices in the M - and M -Treatments. Hence, we can conclude that
participants behave similarly in the first period of the M - and M -Treatments.
Similar results hold for the following period. Neither the number of coop-
erators nor the number of defectors differed significantly between the M - and
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Cooperators Defectors Participants
Strong Weak Weak Strong per Treatment
M 6 39 27 17 92
M 6 43 31 13 96
Table 5: Number of location defectors and location cooperators per treatment
M -Treatment (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test). The same result holds for the
C- and C-Treatment (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test).
Finally, we classified strong location cooperators, i.e., participants who al-
ways invest in other positions, and weak location cooperators, i.e., participants
who invest in other positions for at least half the periods. Accordingly, we de-
fined strong and weak location defectors (see Table 5 for the absolute frequencies
per treatment). We compared the fraction of location defectors (both strong and
weak) and location cooperators (both strong and weak) between Treatments M
and M but found no significant differences using a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U
test.
Result 7: Location choices and initial play do not vary between the M -and
M -Treatment and the C- and C-Treatment, respectively.
6 Discussion
In M-Treatments participants contribute more and thereby reveal greater trust
in the behavior of others, whereas participants in C-Treatments seem to realize
their lack of discrimination power. The variance of α-values has no impact on
the contribution level in the first period: between both M-Treatments and both
C-Treatments there exists no significant difference in first period contributions
(Result 7).
The effect of discrimination power is confirmed in the following periods:
contributions in M -Treatments are higher than in C-Treatments (Result 3).
Punishment and rewarding helps to increase the number of cooperators and to
decrease the number of defectors, at least when we compare M - Treatments and
C-Treatments (Result 4).
The variance between α-values has an impact on discrimination power. The
more similar all α-values are, the less discrimination power a participant has.
Therefore, we expected higher contributions in M -Treatments, which could not
be confirmed, however (Result 3).
In our view, this effect results from the costs of punishment and reward-
ing, where we define punishment as contributing the smallest possible amount
and choosing the most distant location to the person who should be punished.
Rewarding, in turn, is defined by investing the highest possible amount and
locating it to the person who should be rewarded. Independent of the realized
α-values, the costs of punishment do not change much as punishing participants
contribute little. This changes, when we analyze rewarding. A cooperative par-
ticipant, who rewards a distant contact, faces a much higher cost in the M -
than in the M -Treatment. In the M -Treatment, she loses 0.4 of her investment,
when switching from her position to the position of the distant contact, while
she loses only 0.2 of the investment in the M -Treatment. Therefore, the lower
9
cost of rewarding can enhance cooperation in the M -Treatment more than in
the M -Treatment. The experimental data confirm this: the number of max-
imum investments in non-self-serving locations per group is higher in the M -
than in the M - Treatment (Result 5).
While in M -Treatments participants can impose higher punishments and
reward their co-players, their costs are relatively high. In consequence, par-
ticipants do not reward in the M -Treatment as much as they do in the M -
Treatment, which outweighs the effect of higher discrimination power. This
is confirmed by Result 7: with more discrimination power participants do not
contribute more nor do they choose non-self-serving locations more often.
7 Conclusion
Unlike in traditional four-person Public Good Games, participants are organized
in a square and could locate their contribution in one of the four positions. How
much a participant benefits depends on the distance of the contribution to the
own position.
There is no trend toward the benchmark of free-riding and self-serving loca-
tions but rather an increase of cooperation when the game is repeated (Result
1). In each repeated game, participants reveal end game behavior by choosing
low contributions and investing in their own position. Removing the possibility
of choosing the investment location reduces contributions. More discrimination
power, however, does not increase contributions.
At first sight, this result seems quite surprising: more discrimination power
does not enhance cooperation any further. In our view, this is due to the fact
that more discrimination power, as captured here, does indeed allow to punish
or reward a distant neighbor more effectively but only at the cost of an even
greater loss, where the own contribution is rather high. Apparently, the opposite
effects outweigh each other.
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A Instructions
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation.
You will receive e 2.50 for showing up in time. During the experiment, you will
have the opportunity to earn additional money. Please stay calm and switch
of your mobile phone. Please read these instructions carefully which are identi-
cal for all participants. Communication among the participants is not allowed.
If you do not follow these rules, we have to exclude you from the experiment
and, consequently, from any payment. To ensure that you understand the in-
structions, we ask you to answer several control questions before beginning the
experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the ex-
perimenters will then come to you and answer your question in private. The
endowment of e 2.50 for showing up in time as well as any other amount of
money, you earn during the experiment, will be paid to you in cash at the end
of the experiment. We will pay you privately to ensure that no other participant
becomes aware of the amount of your payment.
Figure 2: Placement of participants within one group
Your payment depends on your own decisions as well as the decisions of
other participants. The payoff in the experiment is measured in points. The
points you earn during the experiment will be converted into euro at the end of
the experiment and paid to you. You find the conversion rate at the end of this
document. You and all other participants enter their decisions independently of
other participants in individual computer terminals.
Course of the Experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned to three other
participants, forming groups of four. Each member of your group will be ran-
domly positioned in one corner of a square (see Figure 2). The two other partic-
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Figure 3: Decision screen
ipants, who share one line of the square with you, are your direct neighbors, the
fourth is your distant neighbor. The participants in one group will not neces-
sarily sit side by side. The composition of the group and the positioning remain
unchanged. In the following, “partners” stands for the participants in your
group. The participants of other groups are not considered in the remainder of
these instructions.
Figure 2 shows the arrangement of participants in one group. For example,
the direct neighbors of the participant at position 1 are located at positions 2
and 4. The distant neighbor is located at position 3.
This experiment consists of twenty periods. At the beginning of each period,
you will receive 10 tokens. Subsequently, you have to make two decisions:
• on the amount of your investment, i.e., the number of tokens ranging from
1, 2, ..., 9, 10, and
• on where to place your investment, more precisely: in which partner, i.e.,
at your position, the position of a direct neighbor or a distant neighbor.
While making your decision, you will see the following display on your com-
puter screen (see Figure 3). Your position is visualized in the upper area of the
screen. On the left side you decide on the amount of your investment, and on the
right side you choose the partner in whom you want to place your investment.
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Your Payoff
At the end of each period, your payoff is calculated, based on the decisions of
all participants. The result of this calculation is shown on the computer screen.
The calculation of your payoff is as follows. For each token you have kept,
you receive 10 points. You receive 7 points for every invested token assigned
to you; for each token assigned to a direct neighbor you receive 5 points; and
for every token assigned to the distant neighbor you receive 3 points. For the
final payoff the points are added up over all periods. For 100 points you receive
e 0.20. Payoff is rounded to the next higher amount divisible by 5 euro cent.
This is repeated twenty times. Hence, all groups and the groups’ assignment
to positions in the square remains identical for all twenty periods. Please remain
seated during all periods and only get up when asked.
After these twenty periods the experiment is continued, and you will receive
separate instructions.
Instructions - Restart
Participants are reassigned to groups. During the reassignement, we ensure that
none of your previous partners is part of your new group.
Apart from this, the rules are identical.
At the end of the experiment, the number of your cabin will be called out
and your points will be exchanged into euro.
A.1 Differences in instructions
For all experiments the instructions for the restart were identical.
A.1.1 Differences between C and M Treatments
During C-Treatments, the three paragraphs between “This experiment consists
of twenty periods. [..], in whom you want to place your investment.” are replaced
with the following text:
“This experiment consists of twenty periods. In the beginning of each period,
you will receive 10 tokens. Subsequently, you have to make one decision: on the
amount of your investment, i.e., the number of tokens ranging from 1, 2, ..., 9,
10.
In addition to the amount of the investment you specified yourself, the place-
ment of your investment, i.e., in which partner, i.e., at your position, the position
of a direct neighbor or the distant neighbor, is given by the computer terminal.
The assignment is independent of your behavior.
While making your decision, you will see the following display on your com-
puter screen (see Figure 4). Your position is visualized in the upper area of the
screen. On the left side you decide on the amount of your investment. Addi-
tionally, you see the result of the placement of your investment to a partner
made by the computer terminal.”
No other changes were made in the instructions.
A.1.2 Differences between M ,C and M ,C Treatments
For the M ,C-Treatments in the paragraph “The calculation of your payoff is as
follows: [...] Payoff is rounded to the next higher amount divisible by 5 euro
14
Figure 4: Decision screen
cent.” the multplier of tokens was changed to 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
No other changes were made in the instructions.
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